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Chapter One: Moral Judgment Development 
Piaget and Kohlberg 
Studies about morality have been flourishing since Piaget and Kohlberg’s research on 
the moral development of children. Piaget studied children’s practice and 
consciousness of game rules and proposed three stages of their moral development: (i) 
pre-moral stage with little understanding of rules due to insufficient cognitive 
development, (ii) heteronomous/moral realism stage with strict compliance to rules 
set by authorities like adults or god, and (iii) autonomous morality/moral relativism 
stage with flexible application of rules (Piaget, 1965). Adopting Piaget’s theory, 
Kohlberg used moral dilemma interviews to study children’s processing of moral 
dilemmas. A new theory of cognitive moral development (CMD) was developed 
consisting of three levels and six stages of moral development (Kohlberg, 1971). 
CMD was developed through Kohlberg’s moral interviews of children at different 
ages; the moral interviews consisted many moral dilemmas that invites a thorough 
reasoning process instead of yes/no answers. Through analyzing interviewees’ 
reasoning process Kohlberg found these stages have invariant sequence (no skipping 
of stages) even though there are individual differences at exact transactions time; the 
earlier stages prepare for and are integrated into higher stages which makes the 
system hierarchical. Kohlberg also claimed that this sequence of moral development 
is universal, proven true through cross-cultural studies which revealed a general 





According to CMD, people go through three levels and six stages of moral judgment 
development as they grow up (Kohlberg, 1971). The pre-conventional level (Level I) 
emphasizes children’s simple obedience and application of rules to avoid punishment 
and protecting self-interests; two stages are included in this level—the punishment 
and obedience orientation (stage 1 at the age of infancy) and the instrumental 
relativist orientation (stage 2 at the pre-school going age). At stage 1, the typical 
standard of whether to conduct a bad behavior or not is whether the doer will get 
caught or not; at stage 2, the judging standard becomes whether the doer will get 
benefits (from the behavior) or not. The conventional level (Level II) emphasizes the 
individual’s following of social expectations of different level units; two stages in 
terms of school-going age are included—the interpersonal concordance or “good 
boy-nice girl” orientation (stage 3) and the “law and order” orientation (stage 4). At 
stage 3, being moral is equal to being a “good boy/girl” as expected by the parents 
and teachers; at stage 4, the pure following of social expectations turns to maintaining 
the social order with self inputs. The post-conventional/autonomous/principled level 
(Level III) emphasizes one’s own building of a moral system with certain values and 
principles; two stages are included—the social-contract legalistic orientation (stage 5 
during teenage years) and the universal ethical-principle orientation (stage 6 in 
adulthood). At stage 5, for the first time teens realize that morally right and equally 




abstract universal moral principles are built personally even when they are 
inconsistent with social expectation or existing laws.   
Moral Schemas Theory and Defining Issues Test 
For decades, CMD has dominated the research in moral judgment. However, 
Kohlberg’s legacy also received many criticisms such as assuming Foundational 
Principlism (whether it does exist or how it is developed is still controversial), 
emphasizing deductivism, and believing moral decisions can be guided by abstract 
principles. Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau (2000) developed a Neo-Kohlbergian 
approach and a moral schemas theory, which has addressed some of the criticisms in 
order to increase the possibility/probability of better solutions in moral research. 
Compared with Kohlberg’s CMD theory of six stages, they maintain several key 
features in moral schemas theory: the starting point of cognition, the personal 
construction of epistemological categories, the developmental nature of morality, and 
the shift from conventional to post-conventional moral thinking in developmental 
change (though with softer boundaries). The newly developed features include: (i) 
moral development as being more about the change in pattern of using moral 
schemas, (ii) moral schema is more specific, (iii) moral schemas are the 
content-outputs of operation instead of cognitive operations, (iv) the universality of 
morality should be confirmed by empirical studies, and (v) the use of a multiple 
choice task instead of an interviewing task to improve on the research method (Rest, 




that people also judge others’ moral judgment and are influenced by others’ opinions, 
as well as the fact that defining the same moral problem is different in different moral 
judgment stages, the tool of measuring moral judgment Rest et al. developed—the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT)—provides possible statements representing all moral 
judgment stages and allows participants to judge the importance of them when 
making moral decisions. In this way, people’s preference for different ways of 
defining a moral problem reflects their moral judgment development stages (Rest et 
al., 1974).  
 
Still, DIT is a measure based on Kohlberg’s cognitive-development theory of moral 
judgment (Martin, Shafto, & Vandeinse, 1977; Rest, 1989). Similar to the moral 
dilemma interview, DIT begins with the presentation of moral dilemma first before 
asking questions with statements. In moral schema theory there are three 
schemas—Personal Interest Schema (PIS, reflecting primitive forms of thinking in 
Kohlbergian Stages 2 and 3), the Maintaining Norms Schema (MNS, reflecting the 
maintainance of social order thinking in Kohlbergian Stage 4), and Post-conventional 
Schema (reflecting appealing to shared ideals, fully reciprocal, and openness to 
scrutiny thinking in/between Kohlbergian Stages 5 and 6). By using the DIT the three 
moral schemas will all be activated after reading the statements regarding certain 
moral dilemmas; however, the task of selecting the four most important statements 
can show how people differentiate their patterns in using these schema (Rest, 




four most important statements is the only thing that matters in schema scores 
including PIS score, MNS score, and P-score—the more often a certain stage/schema 
items are picked and the higher they are ranked, the higher the scores of that certain 
stage. The specific calculation procedure will be introduced in a later section. As a 
more objective and easy-to-use measurement, the DIT has been widely used in studies 
on moral education and moral development in longitudinal and/or cross-cultural 
studies with good reliability and validity in examining moral development stages as 
well as moral reasoning structure/pattern (Tsui & Windsor, 2001; Moon, 1985; Ma & 
Cheung, 1996; Rest, 1975).  
 
Empathy and Perspective-taking on Moral Judgment 
Other limitations of Kohlberg’s approach which emphasizes cognitive reasoning as 
well as a narrow focus on justice issues have been noticed. Haidt (2001) proposed a 
‘social intuitionist model’, which suggested that moral judgment comes before 
reasoning as a moral intuition or emotional response. A new theory called moral 
foundation theory was proposed according to the findings that people of different 
cultures or political preferences have different focus when talking about morality; the 
five foundations include harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, 
authority/respect; purity/sanctity, and liberty/oppression (Graham et al., 2012; 




2004). This theory might help to explain why Chinese and Finnish participants have 
different moral judgment scores.  
 
For years, the core issue in debates between these two models is about the role of 
reasoning and intuition/emotion and identifying which is more important for moral 
judgment (Nado, Kelly, & Stick, 2009). Moral reasoning is the nuclear role in the 
studies which follows Kohlberg’s trend (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006); thus, in 
studies applying the rational model, as the reasoning process is upheld, it is not 
surprising that cognitive development is essential. In contrast, in the social intuitionist 
model, moral intuition/emotion is the leading actor and the moral judgment is directly 
generated as it comes into being (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001).  
 
However, distinguishing between people’s affective response and cognitive process is 
nearly impossible. For example, it has been proven that intuition/emotion or reasoning 
are coexisting and interacting but one is going beyond another according to different 
types of dilemmas, e.g. personal dilemma versus impersonal dilemma: According to 
Greene (2009), the footbridge dilemma (an action of pushing) is in an “up close and 
personal” manner, which provokes salient emotion compared with the impersonal 
trolley dilemma (an action of switching). So it is reasonable that researchers can 
individually get evidence to support their arguments while moral reasoning and moral 





In this study, an affective factor—the emotion of empathy, and a sociocognitive 
factor—the tendency of perspective-taking, are taken into account to see how they 
influence moral judgment. On the individual level, empathy and perspective-taking 
are very important factors that affect morality; there have been many studies of the 
influence of empathy and perspective-taking on moral behaviors such as altruism, 
helping behavior, and prosocial behavior. Even though there were some negative 
evidence found (e.g. Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & Brady-Smith, 1977), according 
to the review by Underwood & Moore (1982) on perspective-taking and altruism, the 
strong relationship between perspective-taking and altruism was soundly proved by 
meta-analysis while the relationship between empathy and altruism stayed unclear. 
However, later evidence generally showed positive correlations between these two 
factors and prosocial behaviors. For example, children tended to engage in higher 
levels of dispositional cognitive empathy and conduct more prosocial behavior under 
parenting that engages them with perspective-taking practices (Farrant, Devine, 
Maybery, & Fletcher, 2012); similar results were found on altruism in adults in which 
perspective-taking positively correlated to empathy concern and altruistic helping 
(Oswald, 1996). In addition, as an affective factor, empathy contributes to moral 
emotion, moral motivation, and moral behavior (Hoffman, 2000). Empathy can “fuel 
one’s initial reasons for taking the other’s perspective and could thereby lead to 
increased deliberation about moral principles” (p.194, Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). 
Pizarro (2000) also suggested an emotive moral judgment model claiming empathy 




situational context, empathic arousal has an fundamental effect on both top-down and 
bottom-up moral processing. As a cognitive factor, perspective-taking is a prerequisite 
for moral development (Walker, 1980). Perspective-taking opportunities facilitate 
moral judgment development along different stages as well as help account for moral 
development delays (Gibbs et al., 2007).  
 
These two factors are closely connected, or we can say they are interrelated, which 
means they are interactive. Perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal can influence 
the generation of empathic concern (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Pizarro, 2000). 
As one of the components of empathy, perspective-taking also has an effect on 
cognitive structures of merging self and others, which helps to explain why empathy 
affect us; the function of activating self-related thoughts in perspective-taking could 
help to explain people’s judgment or behavior, for example, helping, toward others as 
it might also activate self-related cognitive schemas (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 
1996; Davis et al., 2004). Unsurprisingly most of the studies relate empathy and 
perspective-taking together and see how they affect people’s behavior. Many studies 
have shown that empathy and perspective-taking influence moral reasoning, moral 
behavior, and moral development. For instance, the study by Myyry, Juujärvi, and 
Pesso (2010) found that empathy and perspective-taking predict moral schemas; 
empathic concern has a negative association with the maintaining norms schema 
while both empathic concern and perspective-taking have a positive relation to 




perspective-taking can predict the level of socio-cognitive conflict and feelings of 
sympathy when facing real-life dilemmas (Myyry & Helkama, 2007). Besides general 
concepts of perspective-taking and empathy, other empathy-related constructs play 
considerable roles in morality. Eisenberg’s (2000) review showed that 
empathy-related responding including sympathy and personal distress plays very 
important role in moral behaviors, while sympathy can boost altruism as an 
other-oriented moral emotion, personal distress plays an independent or negative role 
in prosocial behavior. Later studies also provided empirical evidence for this claim. 
For example, Skoe (2010) found that empathy-related constructs are closely related to 
care-based moral reasoning, the more one can take others’ perspective the more 
he/she get integrated into care reasoning while there is an opposite correlation when it 
comes to personal distress. According to Skoe’s review on Hoffman’s theory, children 
develop the ability of getting involved in others’ distress as early as they can separate 
their own internal states from others’ before developing more sympathetic concern 
toward others, which later motivates prosocial behavior. Even though the mechanism 
of certain empathy-related responding on prosocial behavior is still controversial—for 
example, if it is pure altruism to help others or if it is a way to reduce one’s own 
distress—the point that empathy plays an important role in moral development is 
soundly proved. Thus, in this study, using Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index, 
which will be introduced in the next chapter, all empathy-related constructs except 
personal distress—mainly perspective-taking and empathy concern—will be analyzed 





Chapter Two: Empathy and Intergroup Relations 
Empathy—A Multi-dimensional Concept 
What is empathy? There is no unified definition of empathy since there are numerous 
arguments about the construct and nature of empathy. According to Duan and Hill’s 
review on empathy research in 1996, some theorists take empathy as “a personality 
trait or general ability”, some take it as “a situation-specific cognitive-affective state”, 
and some others take it as “a multiphased experiential process”. Besides the 
inconsistency of its construct, the affective and/or cognitive nature of empathy is also 
disputed. As more and more studies have shown that cognitive and affective reactions 
cannot be separated, the definition by Hoffman that empathy includes the cognitive 
awareness of another person’s internal states and the vicarious affective response to 
another person is taken as the main guild in the current study. A multi-dimensional 
measure of empathy that consists of both cognitive and affective reactions called 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index developed by Davis (1980, 1983) was used in this 
study. There are four components in Davis’ concept of empathy: (i) 
perspective-taking (PT), which refers to the ability to put oneself into others’ shoes 
and see from others’ psychological point of view; (ii) fantasy (FS), which refers to the 
tendency to imagine oneself as unrealistic characters in stories; (iii) empathic concern 
(EC), which refers to feelings of concern toward others in misfortune; and (iv) 




misfortune. While EC measures “other-oriented” feelings of sympathy, PD taps into  
“self-oriented” feelings of anxiety and being uncomforting. Correspondingly, there 
are four subscales measuring the dispositional tendencies of these four aspects—on 
one hand they are distinct but reflecting the “general definition of empathy as a 
reaction to the observed experience of another”, on the other hand they are working in 
a related manner and thoroughly as “a set of constructs” (p.114, Davis, 1983).  
 
Empathy in Intergroup Relations 
As some studies mentioned above suggest , empathy and perspective-taking play 
significant roles in intergroup relations. Social psychologists have been seeking the 
function of empathy and perspective-taking in out-group attitudes and behaviors. 
Empathy was proved to be a significant mediator in different intergroup contexts that 
helps to shape intergroup attitude and behavior; this function of mediation also helps 
to explain the positive effect of perspective-taking on intergroup relations (Shih, 
Stotzer, & Gutiérrez, 2013; Mashuri, Hasanah, & Rahmawati, 2012; Dovidio et al., 
2010; Shih, Wang, Bucher, & Stotzer, 2009; Batson et al., 1997).  
 
Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom (2009) found that empathy as a mediator can be 
influenced by social categorization process people expressed higher empathy and 
helping tendency when simply informed of the in-group membership of the target. 




how changing empathy or perspective-taking can improve intergroup attitudes and 
behaviors. Batson et al.’s (1997) studies on attitudes toward stigmatized groups, 
including people with AIDS, the homeless, and murderers, all showed that inducing 
empathy toward a certain person can improve the attitude toward the whole group that 
the person belongs to. This correlation was also proved to be quite enduring; Mashuri 
et al. (2012) found evidence that while perspective-taking toward out-group members 
had a positive effect on out-group helping, empathy played as a mediator in this 
process. Similarly, by inducing perspective-taking toward a certain out-group through 
movie clips, scholars found that the participants had more empathic feelings when 
paragraphing the movie as well as increased liking toward the target group; in further 
study they found the manipulation also worked on helping behavior toward out-group 
member (Shih et al., 2009). Later study showed that the same manipulation also had 
an implicit and more general effect on reducing group bias toward all out-groups—no 
significant difference on reaction time was found when judging good and bad words 
after exposed to “us” and “them” (Shih et al., 2013). Galinsky & Moskowitz (2000) 
also found similar explicit and implicit evidence that perspective-taking increased 
out-group evaluation. However, instead of taking empathy as a mediator, they 
proposed and provided a different angle of explanation that the positive effects of 
perspective-taking came with the activation of self-concept—the more the target 
group representations are self-like, the less the out-group stereotype. As demonstrated 
above, the positive effect of empathy and perspective-taking on intergroup relations 





Considering these effects of empathy and perspective-taking on moral judgment and 
intergroup relations, it is reasonable to predict that intergroup level factors such as 
group membership and moral inclusion/exclusion would have an effect on moral 
judgment mediated by empathy and perspective-taking. In the next chapter, moral 
inclusion/exclusion and its effect on moral judgment will be introduced.  
 
Chapter Three: Moral Inclusion/Exclusion and the Model Study 
Intergroup Dynamics on Moral Judgment 
In addition to the individual level, as socialized human beings, it is also inevitable that 
a socio-psychological perspective should be taken into account when discussing moral 
issues. When facing a moral issue, there are usually two main actors: the protagonist 
in the situation and the audience observing the situation. The intergroup relation 
between the audience and protagonist is one of the situational factors that influences 
moral judgment or moral reasoning. Besides the membership of the audience and 
protagonist, personal dispositional attitude toward others is also influential in this 
process. Many scholars have pointed out that moral reasoning studies should be 
integrated with intergroup dynamics as well as individual level factors so that we can 
have a better understanding of moral dilemmas and better able to promote morality in 




study explores how group membership and personal moral inclusion/exclusion 
orientation influence moral judgment.  
 
Moral inclusion/exclusion refers to the phenomenon that people apply different 
standards to different individuals or groups when judging moral issues. There is a 
boundary of applying moral values, rules, and consideration of fairness for us; moral 
inclusion and exclusion happen according to our consideration of whether others are 
inside this boundary or not (Opotow, 1990a).  
 
Numerous communities constitute the society. People like to categorize themselves 
into different groups according to certain criteria. It is the same when facing moral 
issues is the same: by building this moral boundary people form a moral 
community—most of the time implicitly—and their moral judgment, moral reasoning, 
and moral behavior are all influenced by this community, which is also called “the 
scope of justice” (Opotow, 1990a). Many symptoms were introduced as signifiers of 
moral exclusion by Opotow, they include: biased evaluation of groups, derogation, 
dehumanization, fear of contamination, expanding the target, accelerating the pace of 
harm doing, open approval of destructive behavior, reducing moral standards, 
blaming the victim, self-righteous comparison, desecration, groupthink, transcendent 
ideologies, deindividuation, moral engulfment, psychological distance, 
condescension, technical orientation, double standards, unflattering comparisons, 




of harmful behavior, glorifying violence, normalizing violence, temporal containment 
of harm doing. From these symptoms we found the phenomenon of moral exclusion is 
universal—it can occur in our daily life even without our awareness.  
 
It has been claimed that the psychological roots of moral exclusion lie in personal 
interactions with others and the integration of good and bad self, good and bad others 
during personal development (Deutsch, 1990). Opotow (1990a) also pointed out that 
the psychological origins of moral exclusion are the conflict and unconnectedness 
with others. Thus, it is reasonable that the moral boundary is changeable and 
individualized. A research about children’s moral and psychological judgment on 
disabled peers found that children become more and more sensitive to inclusion and 
exclusion notions as they grow up (Gasser, Malti, & Buholzer, 2014). Some strategies 
such as approval of divergent opinions or pluralistic perspective are helpful to enlarge 
the scope of justice so that moral exclusion can be deterred as a result (Opotow, 
1990b). It is also worth mentioning that the moral boundaries can be anything—such 
as natural boundaries like gender, race, or age; or they can be specified boundaries 
such as nationality, religions, or political affiliation. Moral inclusion/exclusion theory 
has been used as a framework for educating for peace (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 
2005), understanding prejudice (Passini, 2013; Tileagă, 2006), and even broader 
issues such as environmentalism (Opotow & Weiss, 2000) and human rights (Passini, 
2011). In the current study, moral inclusion/exclusion theory can help to understand 




inclusion/exclusion according to certain boundaries affect people’s moral reasoning in 
that people use different moral codes when judging others of different nationalities on 
their moral actions—the moral judgment is harsher toward others outside their moral 
community (Passini, 2014; Passini & Villano, 2013). This study is a replicated study 
of Passini’s studies in recent years, with the addition of moral judgments of people of 
different nationalities committing the same behavior.  
 
The Model Studies 
Passini and Villano’s studies showed that people judge the same action differently 
according to the involving person’s group membership, and the difference is 
moderated by social distance, self-categorization or social dominance orientation 
(Passini, 2014; Passini & Villano, 2013). While equality-oriented or inclusive 
participants (who have smaller social distance with others and categorise themselves 
in a broader unit) showed no significant difference when judging in-group and 
out-group members, exclusive or hierarchy-oriented participants showed less mature 
moral judgment on out-group members. The samples in these two studies were both 
from the Italian general population; the main manipulation in these two studies was 
the changing of protagonists’ nationalities in DIT moral dilemmas—for the in-group 
condition the protagonists were Italian and for the out-group condition the 
protagonists were Romanian. Following this study, the current study used different 




membership affects moral judgment. Instead of measuring social distance, 
self-categorization, or social dominance, the current study applied a newly developed 
measurement of moral inclusion/exclusion by Morselli and Passini (2012)—the Moral 
Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups (MIEG) Scale, which is more straightforward 
than the other indexes. For better understanding of the model studies results, the 
emotional variable empathy was also taken into account. Considering the mediation 
function of empathy on intergroup dynamics, I predict that the effect of moral 
inclusion/exclusion on moral judgment is mediated by empathy.  
 
Chapter Four: The Context of the Current Study 
This study attempted to replicate Passini’s research (2014) on moral judgment. Passini 
found that exclusive participants obtained different moral judgment scores on 
dilemmas with protagonists of different nationalities, the current study tries to answer 
how this happened by the help of empathy and perspective-taking. My goal is to find 
out how individual level and intergroup level factors interact and how this interaction 
affects the moral reasoning process. To achieve this goal, mainly empathy and 
perspective-taking (individual level affective variable and cognitive variable), and 
group menbership and moral inclusion/exclusion (intergroup level variables) are taken 
into account in the current study. By doing so a possible explanation for the past 
studies of prejudice on moral judgment will be tested to see whether people will shut 
down their empathy and perspective-taking automatically toward out-group members 




also provide evidence for future moral judgment studies focusing on both individual 
and contextual level factors. In the meantime, considering the fact that Finland is 
becoming more multi-cultural and the world is increasingly globalized, a comparison 
between Finnish and Chinese participant on one hand can provide cross-cultural 
evidence for moral judgment studies; on the other hand it can raise discussions about 
the controversy among multi-cultural moral judgment studies while bringing 
inspiration for scholars in Finland as well as in other countries to know more about 
Chinese moral judgment pattern.  
 
Hypotheses 
All the factors mentioned above, including empathy, perspective-taking, group 
membership, and moral inclusion/exclusion correlate with moral judgment. Based on 
the evidence that empathy and perspective-taking facilitate moral judgment and moral 
behaviors (Gibbs et al., 2007; Hoffman, 2000; Underwood & Moore, 1982) as well as 
predict moral schemas (Myyry, Juujärvi, & Pesso, 2010), I expect empathy concern, 
perspective-taking, as well as state empathy positively correlate with higher stage 
moral judgment. Based on moral inclusion/exclusion theory (Opotow, 1990a), I 
expect moral inclusion orientation to correlate with higher stage moral judgment 
positively while moral exclusion orientation correlates with it negatively. Also, since 
empathy and perspective-taking increase positive intergroup attitudes and behavior 




them to mediate the relationship between moral inclusion/exclusion and moral 
judgment. As for protagonist membership in moral dilemmas and moral 
inclusion/exclusion on moral judgment, I hypothesize that the results of model studies 
will be replicated—the protagonist membership will have an effect on moral 
judgment and this effect would be moderated by moral inclusion/exclusion; the 
protagonist membership would also have an effect on empathy and perspective-taking 
scores—the scores would be lower in out-group condition and higher in in-group 
condition. As for national differences between Finnish and Chinese, according to 
Hofstede & Hofstede (2004), Finland has higher value pluralism and lower power 
distance (p. 43-44) compared to China, and as Helkama and Sortheix (2015) have 
shown in their review that low power distance predicts moral judgment development 
on the Kohlberg measures, I expect the Finnish participants to have a higher moral 
judgment score in higher stage as equal and universal principles are highly valued; 
and as China has lower individualism (p. 78-79) and uncertainty avoidance (p. 
168-169) compared to Finland, I expect the Chinese participants to have higher moral 
inclusion score as they feel less threatened by “ambiguous or unknown situations”.  
 
To sum up, I hypothesize:  
1. Protagonist membership has an effect on moral judgment and this effect is 
moderated by moral inclusion/exclusion; it also has an effect on empathy and 
perspective-taking scores—the scores are lower in out-group condition and 




2. Moral inclusion and empathy-related constructs’ scores except personal 
distress score all correlate with P-score positively; empathy related constructs 
mediate the correlation between moral inclusion/exclusion and moral 
judgment; 
3. Finnish participants have higher P-score while Chinese participants have 
higher MIEG score.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 37 Finnish volunteers and 56 Chinese volunteers who had been 
living or used to live in Finland, of which 47 are female and 46 are male. Participants 
were from different age groups—4.3% were under 20, 44.1% are between 20 to 25, 
32.3% are between 26 to 30, 16.1% are between 31 to 35, and 3.2% are over 35. All 
of the participants were randomly assigned to different groups to judge dilemmas with 
different protagonist names—32 were assigned to control group, 32 to in-group, and 
29 to out-group. More details about the protagonist names will be introduced later. 
Calling for volunteers to the survey was mainly delivered through University of 
Helsinki’s mail-list system and respondents’ voluntarily forwarding the message. No 





Participants completed all the measures below as well as demographic information 
including nationality, gender, and age group at the end. 
Moral reasoning: The Defining Issue Test (DIT)  
There are six dilemmas in the original DIT. In the current study, a short form DIT in 
both Finnish and Chinese version were used, which includes three dilemmas—Heinz 
and the Drug, Escaped Prisoner, and Newspaper in the Finnish version; Heinz and the 
Drug, Escaped Prisoner, and Doctor’s Dilemma in the Chinese version. The third 
dilemma was different in the Finnish and Chinese version because the Newspaper 
story is not practical in China. Each dilemma is followed by one general opinion 
question about what the protagonist in the dilemma should do—e.g. should steal the 
drug/should not steal the drug/cannot decide, then twelve more specific questions 
constructed according to the six development stages in Kohlberg’s theory in random 
order, and finally a task of ranking four of the most important items listed above.  
 
Except for the control group condition, names of the protagonists in all three moral 
dilemmas in the Finnish version and the first two moral dilemmas in the Chinese 
version (Note: The Doctor’s dilemma does not have a named protagonist) were 
modified to indicate different nationalities and thus forming an implicit impression of 





For the Finnish version, ordinary Finnish names were used as an in-group condition 
and ordinary Russian names as an out-group condition. For the Chinese version, 
ordinary Chinese last names were used as an in-group condition and ordinary Finnish 
names as an out-group condition. Russian names were used in Finnish out-group 
condition due to the historical reason that there was the Winter War between Finland 
and Soviet Union during World War II, which was the latest war memory for Finnish 
people; Finnish names were used in Chinese out-group condition due to the fact that 
while Chinese international students or new immigrants are minorities here in 
Finland, the most obvious out-group representatives would be the local Finnish 
people. In the Heinz and the Drug dilemma, the names in the Finnish version were 
Heinz (control group)/Mika (in-group)/Andrei (out-group) and the names in the 
Chinese version were Heinz (control group)/Mr.Zhao (in-group)/Mika (out-group). In 
the Escaped Prisoner dilemma, the names in the Finnish version are Thompson & 
Mrs. Jones (control group)/Tuomela & Mrs. Jokipii (in-group)/Ivanov & Mrs. Jones 
(out-group) and the names in the Chinese version were Thompson & Mrs. Jones 
(control group)/Mr. Sun and Mrs. Li (in-group)/ Tuomela & Mrs. Jokipii (out-group). 
In the Newspaper dilemma, the names in the Finnish version were Fred (control 
group)/Pekka (in-group)/Pavel (out-group). In the Doctor’s dilemma, no names were 
specified in any of the three conditions.  
 
After showing the scenario, there is a basic question asking how the protagonist in the 




Following that 12 more questions related to moral reasoning were shown, to be 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘great’ to ‘no importance’. Finally, the 
subject had to select 4 of the 12 questions as the most important ones and rank them 
from ‘the most important item’ to ‘the fourth most important’ according to their 
importance to the subject. As mentioned above, the scoring of the DIT only concerns 
the ranking of the four most important statements that the participant chose in every 
dilemma: PIS score is calculated according to the participant’s choosing and ranking 
of stage 2 and stage 3 items; MNS score is calculated according to the participant’s 
choosing and ranking of stage 4 items; Principled Reasoning score (P-score) is 
calculated according to the participant’s choosing and ranking of stage 5 and stage 6 
items. The rankings are with different weights—the first choice was weighted as 4 
points, the second 3 points, the third 2 points, and the fourth 1 point. Taking P-score 
as an example: there are three items of stage 5 and stage 6 in Heinz and the Drug 
dilemma, if these three items were ranked as the first, second, and third choice, the 
participant gets a total of 4+3+2=9 points in this dilemma, which is also the possible 
highest score in this case since any other stage items chosen here would not be 
calculated into the P-score; to get the P-score for this participant, the added up score 
should be divided by the possible highest score of all dilemmas. The calculation for 





Moral inclusion/exclusion: Moral Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups (MIEG) Scale  
MIEG scale is an instrument for measuring both moral inclusion and exclusion 
symptoms according to the individual’s inclusion/exclusion attitudes towards several 
ethical/cultural groups specified by him/herself. More specifically, MIEG is the 
measuring of “beliefs on social groups being eligible of equal vs. unequal treatments 
in respect to moral values and justice” (p. 3, Morselli & Passini, 2012). There are four 
sets of bipolar items that refer to the 4 groups with a 7-points scale between moral 
exclusion (-3) and moral inclusion (+3). The four bipolar items are: (1) ‘Values held 
by this group represent a threat to our well-being’ versus ‘values held by this group 
represent an opportunity for our well-being’; (2) ‘Members of this group deserve no 
respect’ versus ‘Members of this group deserve our utmost respect’; (3) ‘It is 
necessary to avoid any kind of contact with members of this group’ versus ‘It is 
necessary for all of us to engage in establishing constructive contacts with this group's 
members’; (4) ‘I think that members of this group of people are extremely 
uncivilized’ versus ‘I think that members of this group of people are extremely 
civilized’. Though there are three out-groups specified by the participant, the simple 
scoring of mean in all MIEG items is a general indication of one’s moral 
inclusion/exclusion. Both Finnish and Chinese versions of MIEG were used. Items 
were internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha for Chinese sample 0.901; Cronbach’s 





Empathy and perspective-taking: The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)  
IRI is a multi-dimensional instrument for measuring empathy developed in 1980s by 
Mark H. Davis. There are four subscales in IRI: perspective-taking scale (PT sample 
question: I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision); fantasy scale (FS sample question: When I am reading an interesting story 
or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me); 
empathic concern scale (EC sample question: I often have tender, concerned feelings 
for people less fortunate than me); and personal distress scale (PD sample question: In 
emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease) (Davis, 1983). Originally 
there are a total of 28 items—7 items in each subscale—with a 5-point scale that 
ranges from A (0 = does not describe me well) to E (4 = describes me very well). 
Since the switching of empathy is most concerned in the current study, all FS items 
except item ‘When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would 
feel if the events in the story were happening to me’ are replaced by items measuring 
the state empathy (SE) including ‘I feel right now tender toward others’, ‘I feel right 
now compassionate toward others’, ‘I feel right now softhearted toward others’, ‘I feel 
right now moved toward others’, ‘I feel right now warm toward others’ (Batson et al., 
1997). In this way both the trait empathy and immediate feeling of empathy can be 
measured for a more thorough analysis. In all, there are 5 items (item 4/6/11/15/22) in 
SE, 7 items (item 2/7/10/14/20/24/27) in PT, 7 items (item 1/3/8/13/17/19/21) in EC, 
7 items (item 5/9/12/16/18/23/26) in PD, and 1 item (item 25) in FS. Both Finnish and 




0.815, alpha for PT 0.693, alpha for EC 0.700, and alpha for PD 0.690; Finnish: alpha 
for SE 0.802, alpha for PT 0.779, alpha for EC 0.810, and alpha for PD 0.643).  
 
Procedure 
The survey which was composed of DIT, MIEG, IRI, and the demographic 
information of nationality and gender was conducted online through a1 survey 
platform called E-lomake. Participants were asked to first enter a link and open a 
webpage to selecte their nationality, before being led to the survey with the 
corresponding language. In addtion, through programming they were randomly 
arranged into three groups with different protagonists’ names. The instruction went as 
follows: 
 Dear fellow student, the enclosed questionnaires attempt to find out how people think about social 
problems. Different persons have different opinions on right and wrong. For these questions, there are 
no “right” or “wrong” answers in the same sense as for mathematical problems. Your responses will 
be processed statistically and will be seen only by me. This study is part of my Master’s thesis at the 
University of Helsinki. My supervisor is prof. Klaus Helkama. 
Results 
The scores of the DIT，including Principled Reasoning score (P-score), Personal 
Interest schema score (PIS), and Maintaining Norms schema score (MNS), as well as 
MIEG scale (MIEG), State Empathy scale (SE), Perspective-taking scale (PT), 




were first computed. Assumptions of no data outliers and approximate normality for 
each group of the independent variable were tested for conducting t-tests and one-way 
ANOVA. When assumptions were violated or the sample sizes in different groups are 
far from equal, non-parametric methods were used to test the group differences.  
 
DIT scores, MIEG score, and empathy as a function of experimental condition 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were run on DIT score, MIEG score, and empathy scores by 
protagonists condition: In-group (n = 32), control group (n = 32), and out-group (n = 
29). Only the distribution of EC score was different within the different protagonists 
conditions; the distributions of EC scores were not similar for all conditions, as 
assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot, χ2(2) = 6.691, p = .035. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the difference was between out-group condition (mean rank 
= 38.43) and control group condition (mean rank = 56.08), p = .031, but no difference 
was found between in-group condition (mean rank = 45.69) and any other conditions. 
The protagonists condition had no effect on any other dependent variables here. For 
P-score, χ2(2) = 0.086, p = .958, two-tailed; for PIS score, χ2(2) = 1.741, p = .419, 
two-tailed; for MNS score, χ2(2) = 3.511, p = .173, two-tailed; for MIEG score, χ2(2) 
= 3.391, p = .184, two-tailed; for SE score, χ2(2) = 4.735, p = .094, two-tailed; for PT 






After splitting the data by nationality, Kruskal-Wallis H tests were rerun again; no 
significant difference was found between any two conditions on DIT scores or MIEG 
score. On the distribution of SE score, there was no significant difference across 
different protagonists conditions for Finnish. However, there was significant 
difference across protagonists conditions for Chinese, the distributions of SE score 
were not similar for all conditions, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot, χ2(2) 
= 10.499, p = .005. Pairwise Comparisons showed that the difference was between 
out-group condition (mean rank = 18.50, n = 16) and control group condition (mean 
rank = 36.21, n = 19), p = .004, but no difference was found between in-group 
condition (mean rank = 29.14, n = 21) and any other conditions. On the distribution of 
EC score, the situation is similar to SE score: while there was no difference across 
protagonists conditions in Finnish, there was significant difference across protagonists 
conditions in Chinese. The distributions of SE score were not similar for all 
conditions, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot, χ2(2) = 8.821, p = .012. 
Pairwise Comparisons showed that the difference was between out-group condition 
(mean rank = 22.22, n = 16) and control group condition (mean rank = 37.29, n = 19), 
p = .018, but no difference was found between in-group (mean rank = 25.33, n = 21) 
and any other conditions. On the distribution of PT score, the situation is contrast to 
SE and EC score: while there was no difference across protagonists conditions in 
Chinese, there was significant difference across protagonists conditions in Finnish. 
The distributions of SE score were not similar for all conditionss, as assessed by 




that the difference was between out-group condition (mean rank = 13.27, n = 13) and 
in-group condition (mean rank = 25.32, n = 11), p = .019, but no difference was 
found between control group (mean rank = 19.38, n = 13) and any other conditions. 
On the distribution of PD score, there was significant difference across protagonists 
conditions in Finnish but not Chinese; the distributions of SE score were not similar 
for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot, χ2(2) = 9.502, p = .009. 
Pairwise Comparisons showed that the difference between control-group (mean rank 
= 24.27, n = 13) and in-group (mean rank = 10.95, n = 11), p = .008, but no 
difference between them and control group (mean rank = 20.54, n = 13). 
 
Table 1: Experimental Condition and Nationality on Empathy Scores (Mean rank) 














SE 29.14 18.50 36.21 .005** 18.32 18.77 19.81 .940 
EC 25.33 22.22 37.29 .012* 20.86 16.77 19.65 .627 
PT 25.62 26.12 33.68 .229 25.32 13.27 19.38 .024* 
PD 23.29 30.84 32.29 .171 10.95 20.54 24.27 .009** 
Note. SE = State Empathy; PT = Perspective-taking; EC = Empathy Concern; PD = Personal Distress;  
*p < .05, two-tailed 
**p < .01, two-tailed 
Nationality and DIT scores, MIEG score, and empathy scores 
Mann-Whitney U tests were run to determine if there were differences in DIT scores, 
MIEG score, and empathy scores between Finnish (n = 37) and Chinese (n = 56) 
participants. Differences were found between Finnish and Chinese on DIT scores 
including P-score and MNS score: Distributions of the P-score and MNS score for 




Finnish (mean rank = 59.35) was statistically significantly higher than for Chinese 
(mean rank = 38.84), U = 579, z = -3.590, p < .001, two-tailed; MNS score for 
Finnish (mean rank = 37.00) was statistically significantly higher than for Chinese 
(mean rank = 53.61), U = 1,406, z = 2.907, p = .004, two-tailed. Distributions of the 
MIEG score for Finnish and Chinese were not similar, as assessed by visual 
inspection. MIEG score for Finnish (mean rank = 39.85) were statistically 
significantly lower than for Chinese (mean rank = 51.72), U = 1300.50, z = 2.078, p 
= .038, two-tailed. Distributions of the PD score for Finnish and Chinese were not 
similar, as assessed by visual inspection. PD score for Finnish (mean rank = 29.72) 
were statistically significantly lower than for Chinese (mean rank = 58.42), U = 
1675.50, z = 5.034, p < .001, two-tailed. No significant difference was found on PIS 
score, SE score, EC score or PT score between two nationalities. 
 
Table 2: Nationality on DIT scores, MIEG score, and empathy scores (Mean rank) 
Participant group Chinese (n=56) Finnish (n=37) Sig. 
P-score (%) 38.84 59.35 .001*** 
PIS  46.00 47.66 .771 
MNS  53.61 37.00 .004** 
MIEG  51.72 39.85 .038* 
SE 48.62 44.54 .472 
EC 47.35 46.47 .878 
PT 45.84 48.76 .609 
PD 58.42 29.72 .001** 
Note. P-score (%) = Principle reasoning/post-conventional score; PIS = Personal Interest Schema; MNS = 
Maintaining Norms Schema; MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion; SE = State Empathy; PT = Perspective-taking, FS 
= Fantasy Scale; EC = Empathy Concern; PD = Personal Distress 
*p < .05, two-tailed 
**p < .01, two-tailed 




Gender on DIT scores and MIEG score 
T-tests were run on DIT scores and MIEG score between male (n = 46) and female (n 
= 47); t-tests were run again after separating sample by nationality. In general, female 
had significantly higher P-score (M = 48.85, SD = 16.85) than male (M = 38.55, SD = 
19.57), t(91) = -2.723, p = .008, two-tailed; male had significantly higher PIS score 
(M = 21.28, SD = 15.44) than female (M = 15.44, SD = 11.29), t(79.833) = 2.00, p = 
.049, two-tailed. T-test showed that there is no significant difference between gender 
on MNS score, t(91) = 0.932, p = .354, two-tailed, or MIEG score, t(91) = -1.375, p = 
.172, two-tailed. In Chinese sample, there were only gender differences in P-score (p 
= .023); no significant difference was found in Finnish sample.  
 
Table 3: Gender and DIT scores, MIEG score, and empathy scores 
Variables Combined Chinese Finnish 
Male (n=46) Female (n=47)  Male (n=28) Female (n=28)  Male (n=18) Female (n=19)  
 M SD M SD Sig. M SD M SD Sig. M SD M SD Sig. 
P-score 38.55 19.57 48.85 16.85 .008** 32.91 17.85 42.98 14.14 .023* 47.33 19.33 57.50 17.12 .098 
PIS  21.28 16.34 15.44 11.29 .049* 20.92 16.60 15.94 12.28 .208 21.84 16.29 14.70 9.94 .123 
MNS  35.78 16.15 32.38 18.89 .354 40.52 15.29 35.16 19.58 .259 28.40 14.98 28.27 17.51 .981 
MIEG  1.04 1.14 1.36 1.05 .172 1.33 1.20 1.45 1.11 .694 0.60 0.92 1.22 0.96 .054 
Note. P-score (%) = Principle reasoning/post-conventional score; PIS = Personal Interest Schema; MNS = 
Maintaining Norms Schema; MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion 
*p < .05, two-tailed 
**p < .01, two-tailed 
Age Group and DIT scores, MIEG score, and empathy scores 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were run to determine if there were differences in DIT scores, 
MIEG score, and empathy scores among five age groups of participants. It was only 




pairwise comparison showed that people under 20 scored significant lower (mean 
rank = 11.12) than people between 20 to 25 (mean rank = 52.51), p = .033. No 
significant differences were found for any other variables among different age groups.  
 
MIEG orientation on DIT scores and empathy scores 
To see how moral inclusion/exclusion orientation was related to DIT scores, MIEG 
score—a scale variable—was recoded into a categorical variable of moral 
inclusion/exclusion category: scores under 0 were recoded into group “Moral 
Exclusion (n = 11)”; scores over 0 were recoded into group “Moral Inclusion (n = 
79)”, and scores equal to 0 were recoded into group “Neutral (n = 3)”. Kruskal-Wallis 
H tests were run to detect the moral inclusion/exclusion group differences on DIT 
scores and empathy scores. For P-score, the distributions were not similar for all 
groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot; the distributions of P-scores 
were statistically significantly different among groups, χ2(2) = 10.969, p = .004, 
two-tailed. Pairwise comparisons showed that the statistically significant difference in 
P-score located between the Moral Inclusion group (mean rank = 50.89) and Moral 
Exclusion group (mean rank = 24.32), p = .007, but no difference between Neutral 
group (mean rank = 27.67) and any other groups. Kruskal-Wallis H tests showed that 
there was no significant difference among MIEG orientation groups on PIS score, 
χ2(2) = 1.562, p = .458, two-tailed or on MNS score, χ2(2) = 1.093, p = .579, 
two-tailed. Kruskal-Wallis H tests were also run on SE, EC, PT, and PD by MIEG 




.100, two-tailed; on EC score, χ2(2) = 2.238, p = .327, two-tailed; on PT score, χ2(2) = 
2.921, p = .232, two-tailed; on PD score, χ2(2) = 2.792, p = .248, two-tailed.  
Bivariate correlations and predicting P-score 
Pearson correlations were run to detect the bivariate relationships of the main 
variables. For Chinese sample, P-score positively correlated with SE (r = .494, p < 
.01) and MIEG (r = .278, p < .05) but negatively correlated with PIS (r = -.422, p < 
.01) and MNS (r = -.372, p < .01); EC positively correlated with SE (r = .665, p < 
.01) and PT (r = .517, p < .01); no association between MIEG and any other variables 
was found. For Finnish sample, the P-score positively correlated with PT (r = .511, p 
< .01), EC (r = .466, p < .01), and MIEG (r = .551, p < .01);  EC positively 
correlated with SE (r = .482, p < .01), PT (r = .661, p < .01), and MIEG (r = .397, p 
< .05); MIEG also negatively correlated with PIS (r = -.412, p < .05). Detailed 
coefficients can be found in Table 5 and 6; further comparison between Chinese and 
Finish sample will be discussed later. Considering the hypothesis of mediation effect 
of EC and PT between MIEG and P-score, simple regressions were first run to detect 
the relationships between independent variable—MIEG on mediators—EC and PT, 
and between mediators and dependent variable—P-score; not all these correlations 
were found in either Chinese or Finnish sample, so no further mediation analysis was 
run.  
 
Table 4: Pearson correlation coefficients among main variables in the Chinese sample 
 SE PT FS EC PD MIEG P-score (%) PIS (%) MNS (%) 




PT (.494**) 1        
FS (.334*) .268* 1       
EC (.665**) (.517**) (.406**) 1      
PD (.275*) .309* .008 (.303*) 1     
MIEG .141 .038 -.193 .022 .260 1    
P-score (%) (.266*) .101 .044 .067 .252 .278* 1   
PIS (%) -.083 -.227 -.102 -.096 -.191 .031 -.422** 1  
MNS (%) -.201 .082 -.036 -.044 -.221 -.171 -.372** -.313* 1 
Note. P-score (%) = Principle reasoning/post-conventional score; PIS = Personal Interest Schema; MNS = 
Maintaining Norms Schema; MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion; SE = State Empathy; PT = Perspective-taking, FS 
= Fantasy Scale; EC = Empathy Concern; PD = Personal Distress 
*p < .05, two-tailed 
**p < .01, two-tailed 
( ) correlations contaminated by experiment conditions 
 
Table 5: Pearson correlation coefficients among main variables in the Finnish sample 
 SE PT FS EC PD MIEG P-score (%) PIS (%) MNS (%) 
SE 1         
PT (.428**) 1        
FS .085 .311 1       
EC .482** (.661**) .161 1      
PD .187 -.086 -.008 -.019 1     
MIEG .147 .248 -.322 .397* .183 1    
P-score (%) .268 (.511**) -.058 .466** -.066 .551** 1   
PIS (%) -.088 -.312 .150 -.173 -.114 -.412* -.714** 1  
MNS (%) -.046 (-.347*) -.119 -.353* .059 -.187 -.590** .078 1 
Note. P-score (%) = Principle reasoning/post-conventional score; PIS = Personal Interest Schema; MNS = 
Maintaining Norms Schema; MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion; SE = State Empathy; PT = Perspective-taking, FS 
= Fantasy Scale; EC = Empathy Concern; PD = Personal Distress 
*p < .05, two-tailed 
**p < .01, two-tailed 
( ) correlations contaminated by experiment conditions 
However, hierarchical regressions were run for predicting P-score. Considering some 
of the gender effects and protagonists group effects found on P-score or 
empathy-related constructs scores, dummy variables were made for protagonists 
group taking control group as the reference group and together with gender they 
entered the first block, empathy-related constructs including SE, EC, and PT entered 





For Chinese sample, all models were not fitting the data well. Gender was found to be 
a significant predictor on P-score (with male coded “1” and female coded “0”, β = 
-.306, p < .05) before empathy-related variables and MIEG entered; SE was also 
found to be a significant predictor on P-score (β = .430, p < .05) before MIEG 
entered. Regression coefficients and standard errors can be found in Table 7 below.  
 
Table 6: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Chinese Participants 
Variable  B SEB β R2 F for change in R2 
Model 1    .093 1.786 
Gender -10.154 4.473 -.306*   
In-group 1.315 5.232 .038   
Out-group 1.101 5.581 .030   
Model 2    .185 1.849 
Gender -8.761 4.548 -.264   
In-group 1.338 5.355 .039   
Out-group 5.124 6.114 .139   
SE 2.069 0.908 .430*   
EC -1.032 0.819 -.234   
PT -.056 0.661 -.013   
Model 3    .235 2.102 
Gender -8.821 4.452 -.266   
In-group 4.199 5.485 .122   
Out-group 5.346 5.986 .146   
SE 1.711 0.911 .356   
EC -.818 0.811 -.186   
PT .013 0.648 .003   
MIEG 3.510 1.982 .240   
Note. Dependent variable = P-score; B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = Standard error of the coefficient; β = 
standardized coefficient; SE = State Empathy; EC = Empathy Concern; MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion 
*p < .05  
 
For Finnish sample, with all three blocks variables, the regression model statistically 
significantly predicted P-score, F(7, 29) = 3.660, p = .006, adj. R2 = .341. However, 




significance to the prediction. Regression coefficients and standard errors can be 
found in Table 8 below.  
 
Table 7: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Finnish Participants 
Variable  B SEB β R2 F for change in R2 
Model 1    .086 1.039 
Gender -10.857 6.376 -.294   
In-group 4.705 7.797 .117   
Out-group 1.916 7.581 .050   
Model 2    .307 2.218 
Gender -3.683 6.322 -.100   
In-group -1.806 7.505 -.045   
Out-group 3.201 7.432 .083   
SE -0.067 0.924 -.013   
EC 0.599 0.823 .166   
PT 1.572 0.898 .419   
Model 3    .469 3.660** 
Gender -0.674 5.720 -.018   
In-group 0.811 6.741 .020   
Out-group 5.599 6.668 .145   
SE 0.150 0.826 .029   
EC -0.122 0.772 -.034   
PT 1.673 0.800 .446*   
MIEG 8.693 2.925 .456**   
Note. Dependent variable = P-score; B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = Standard error of the coefficient; β = 
standardized coefficient; SE = State Empathy; EC = Empathy Concern; MIEG = Moral inclusion/exclusion 
*p < .05 
**p < .01  
Discussion 
This study examined the effect of moral inclusion/exclusion, empathy, and 
perspective-taking on moral judgment by experimentally manipulating the dilemma 
protagonist’s in-group/out-group status by means of different names. By doing so, the 
connection between individual level factor—affective arousals of empathy -, and 




comparison between Finnish and Chinese samples also provided a multi-cultural 
angle to studying moral judgment.  
 
Hypothesis 1—that the protagonist membership has an effect on moral judgment and 
this effect is mediated by moral inclusion/exclusion—was not supported, since no 
significant differences on P-score were found between conditions. However, the 
expectation that empathy and perspective-taking scores are lower in out-group 
condition and higher in the in-group condition was partially supported. Though this 
study failed to replicate Passini’s (2014) finding that exclusive (low MIEG)  
participants scored significantly lower on moral judgment in the out-group condition, 
the protagonist membership had an effect on empathy and perspective-taking scores 
in some groups. The main reason that the replication failed could be the fact that the 
participants, university students, tended to display low prejudice—overall the whole 
sample scored high on MIEG. However, generally the participants who saw out-group 
protagonists’ names in moral dilemmas scored lowest in SE, EC, PT, and PD. Chinese 
participants in the out-group condition scored significantly lower on SE and EC while 
Finnish participants in out-group condition scored significantly lower in PT and PD. 
This nationality difference could result from the daily intergroup dynamic between 
participants and the certain out-groups specified here (for Finnish participants the 
out-group members are protagonists with Russian names, and Finnish names for 
Chinese participants) since there is neural evidence that people may have varying 




discussion can be done here because of the singular out-group setting in the study. 
The results were not perfect in that differences were only found in some groups, 
though, as a whole they suggested that people did shut off empathy and 
perspective-taking toward out-group members just by seeing their names. This finding 
is consistent with past studies of intergroup empathy that usually empathy toward 
out-group members is harder to be aroused and more fragile (Cikara, Bruneau, & 
Saxe, 2011). Neural evidence also shows that people’s empathy may be limited to 
certain in-group members so that the emotionality cannot be realized by them; the size 
of this empathy-gap is related to their prejudice level (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). Some 
intergroup theories can provide some explanation about this kind of “empathy 
failure”. The classical study by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) showed that 
even “mere” social categorization can lead to derogation toward the out-group; 
Tarrant, Dazeley, and Cottom (2009) revealed that social categorization processes 
have an effect on empathy activation so that empathy is weaker when confronting 
out-group members. According to infra-humanization theory, “Restricting the full 
human nature to in-groups leads to ‘infrahumanize’ out-groups”; uniquely human 
emotions such as love, compassion, and concern are activated less when they are 
connected with out-group members compared with in-group members (Vaes, 
Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). Thus, it is reasonable that participants showed stronger 





Hypothesis 2—that moral inclusion and empathy related scores are all correlated with 
P-score positively; empathy related constructs mediate the correlation between moral 
inclusion/exclusion and moral judgment—was partially proved. For Finnish sample, 
P-score correlates with PIS and MNS score negatively, while correlating with PT and 
EC score positively, which is consistent with past studies (e.g. Myyry et al., 2010). 
However, for Chinese sample, while the negative correlations between P-score and 
PIS and MNS score were similar to the Finnish sample, the correlation between 
P-score and PT or EC score was not found—although there was a positive correlation 
between P-score and SE for the Chinese. Both samples had positive correlation 
between P-score and MIEG score. For the Finnish sample, the independent 
correlations between PD and either PT or EC, and strong correlation between EC and 
PT were consistent with Davis’ findings in 1983; however, there was an unexpected 
positive correlation between PD and PT and EC found in Chinese sample. Still, there 
was a similar correlation between PD and EC found in an adolescent sample (Silfver, 
Helkama, Lönnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2008); some other studies also found links 
between PD and both PT and EC according to Davis’ review (Davis, 1994, p. 122). 
Also, there were strong correlations between SE and PT (Chinese: r = .494, p < .01; 
Finnish: r = .428, p < .001) or EC (Chinese: r = .665, p < .01; Finnish: r = .482, p < 
.01) for both samples. While Chinese SE also had moderately positive correlation 
with FS (r = .334, p < .01) and PD (r = .275 p < .01), no similar result was found in 
Finnish sample. In both samples a positive correlation was found between MIEG 




.01) than Chinese (r = .278, p < .05) participants; the Finnish MIEG score also had a 
positive correlation with EC score (r = .397, p < .01) and a negative correlation with 
PIS score (r = -.412, p < .005). Though the results were not perfectly consistent with 
the hypothesis, still, people with higher empathy toward others, stronger 
perspective-taking tendency, and more inclusive orientation showed higher moral 
judgment scores.  
 
Hypothesis 3—that there are national differences on moral judgment and moral 
inclusion/exclusion scores that Finnish participants have higher P-score while Chinese 
participants have higher MIEG score—was supported. On moral judgment, while both 
Finnish and Chinese scored very low in PIS, Finnish participants obtained 
significantly higher P-scores (stage 5 & 6, post-conventional stage) and Chinese 
participants significantly higher MNS scores (stage 4, conventional stage). According 
to Rest’s moral schema theory (1999), MNS has the elements of a) need for norms, b) 
societywide scope; c) uniform, categorical application; d) partial reciprocity; and e) 
duty orientation；and Post-conventional Schema has the elements of a) primacy of 
moral criteria; b) appeal to an ideal, c) sharable ideals, and d) full reciprocity. The 
finding of higher score in MNS (stage 4) for Chinese is consistent with past studies 
with Chinese sample according to the review by Bay (2002); Bay also proposed that 
the reason for the inconsistency in cross-cultural studies could be “an artifact of the 
DIT, or a consequence of application of Kohlberg’s theory”. Here I hold the same 




from cultural differences. For example, while the dilemmas used here were not 
covering every moral domain, different cultures may have particular focus. When 
moral issues of harm, rights, and justice were exclusively discussed in the past, many 
psychologists suggest more moral domains needed to be explored, especially in 
different cultures (e.g. Haidt, 1992). Graham and Haidt developed moral foundation 
theory claiming that five moral foundations (later added to six) were embedded in our 
nature as modules but later triggered, shaped, and constructed by our different 
cultures so that people might have different priorities of concerns when dealing with 
moral issues. These foundations are Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, 
Ingroup/Loyalty; Authority/Respect; Purity/Sanctity; Liberty/Oppression (Graham et 
al., 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Empirical studies showed that liberals or westerners 
have a narrow moral domain focusing more on harm and fairness while conservatives 
or people from non-western cultures are more concerned with loyalty, authority, or 
purity (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007). From this angle, it 
is found that some stage 4 items in the dilemmas used in this study indicated issues of 
respecting law or what is right (e.g. upheld the law in Drug dilemma, authorized right 
to publish in Newspaper dilemma)—mapping Authority/Respect foundation, 
considering one’s duty (e.g. duty to the student in Newspaper dilemma, duty to the 
society in Escaped Prisoner dilemma)—mapping Authority/Respect foundation, or 
keeping promise (e.g. promise of publishing way in Newspaper dilemma, keep 
personal principle of being a doctor in Doctor dilemma)—mapping the Purity/Sanctity 




Chinese get higher MNS score—they might consider moral domains other than 
merely harm and fairness during the process of moral judgment, which were 
somehow reflected in stage 4 items.  
 
Another possibility is that the moral development stages may not be universal across 
different cultural contexts. When it was proved that the basic moral judgment 
development is universal across cultures, there might still be controversy among the 
shift between higher stages according to the review by Gibbs et al. (2007). Some 
Chinese scholars especially, have argued that the higher moral judgment development 
stages do not fit into Chinese culture perfectly as the model was developed from a 
western philosophy while China has been deeply influenced by Confucian and 
Taoistic conceptions of morality (Kit-Tai Hau & Lew, 1989; Ma, 1988). Ma (1988) 
proposed a theory integrating Chinese philosophers’ work that Kohlbergian stage 4, 
stage 5, and stage 6 were reconstructed by both Chinese and western perspective; a 
very significant difference was the affective perspective—such as emphasizing 
Ch’ing (affection) and Jen (humanity) of Chinese and the rational perspective of 
westerners. An empirical cross-cultural study among Hong Kong Chinese, English, 
and Americans found that Chinese tended to find more similarity between items in 
stage 4 and items in stage 5 and 6 while people from other two cultures tended to find 
that items in stage 4 are more similar to items in stage 2 and 3 (Ma & Cheung, 1996). 
This situation concerns more the understanding of the statement in different stages. 




culture, it is reasonable to assume that Chinese get “stuck” in lower stage for 
maintaining a harmonious society according to DIT, which was built upon Kohlberg’s 
theory. In addition, because Chinese people emphasize scarifying of self interest to 
overall interest (affective) instead of calculating total utility (rational) when it comes 
to higher stage (e.g. stage 5), P-score might not be a good index reflecting higher 
moral stage for Chinese.  
 
Another situation is that China has kept a high speed of economic development since 
the economic reform in late 1970s while the law and management system have not 
followed up. Huge and complex societal change has been shaping people’s thinking 
and behaving; simply following tradition is not working, so new generations are eager 
for rules and orders to prevent chaos. Similar results were found in a study comparing 
Chinese and western auditors (e.g. from U.S.A and Australia) where the latter had 
higher P-score; the difference was explained by the inconsistency of Chinese culture 
and higher levels in Kohlberg’s theory (Tsui, 1996; Tsui & Windsor, 2001). Based on 
Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions—uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power 
distance, and long term orientation, Tsui & Windsor inferred that higher level of 
moral judgment should be consistent with culture of individualism, equal social 
relationships, rationality, and strong uncertainty avoidance, which is exactly the 





The MIEG score in contrast to the P-score, had the Chinese participants scoring 
significantly higher than Finnish participants, which means Chinese participants had 
stronger moral inclusion orientation toward out-groups even though both groups had 
moral inclusion orientation. Since there is hardly any studies focusing on 
cross-cultural moral inclusion/exclusion—especially since the MIEG scale was 
developed in 2012 (Morselli & Passini, 2012), it is hard to compare the current result 
with other studies. However, a possible explanation could be located in the concept of 
“self” for Chinese. Chinese psychologist Zhongfang Yang objects that most western 
scholars simplify the pattern of doing research when it concerns the Chinese; for 
example, when talking about the cultural difference people tend to see Chinese culture 
simply as collectivism vis-à-vis individualism. In fact, Yang (2009) thinks a Chinese 
person consider “self” in the center of a circle as well as embrace others as “self 
circles” around the “self center”; in this way, Chinese culture emphasize moral 
cultivation as including more and more others into the self circles with the ultimate 
developed stage as universal moral inclusion—others become part of self and the self 
becomes fully integrated into society. This process is also a transition from “small 
me” (self) to “big me” (society, nation, and even universe). This kind of self-centered 
thinking, however, is different from so-called individualism: while the western 
individualism is more “self-contained”, other cultures’ individualism is more 
“ensembled” (Sampson, 1988, cited by Yang, 2009). This is in fact consistent with 
Opotow’s moral inclusion/exclusion theory. Opotow (1990a) concluded that there are 




derived from our perceptions of situation; the other is feeling of un-connectedness, 
which results from our perceptions of relationships. Thus, how we see and how we 
feel about others and how we categorize them could be influential in moral 
inclusion/exclusion. It is also important in how we identify ourselves and how we 
identify others. For example, Passini (2013) proved that there is a close relation 
between moral identity and moral inclusion. Thus, from this angle it is reasonable that 
Chinese participants in this study showed a strong moral inclusion toward out-groups 
as Chinese parents and society have cultivated them in the way of enlarging the self 
circle to achieve self-fulfillment. Besides, most of the Chinese participants were 
international students or new immigrants here in Finland who enjoy living in a 
multi-cultural environment. Similarly most of the Finnish participants were college 
students who have been meeting and communicating with fellow students from 
different backgrounds, who are likely to be less prejudiced toward out-groups than 
ordinary people.  
 
Besides the hypotheses, there are several additional issues worth mentioning here. 
First, besides the differences in P-score, MNS score, and MIEG score, Chinese also 
scored significantly higher on PD, which could be the effect of the pressures of living 
in a foreign country. Second, females scored significantly higher than males on P and 
lower on PIS; females scored significantly higher on all empathy-related constructs 
including SE, EC, PT, and PD. According to Bay’s review on using DIT in 




by gender are small, women’s high scores in DIT (in the review this refers to higher 
stage score) could be because of their experiences of playing more different roles in 
line with Kohlberg’s idea that the maturing of moral development is accompanied by 
richer life experiences. As for empathy-related constructs, it somehow relates to the 
common knowledge that females are more “empathic” than males; however, the 
empirical evidences are mixed according to Davis’ review (1994). According to 
Davis’ review, in his own study he also found higher EC and PD scores for females 
but only slightly higher in PT (p. 60); Hoffman claimed females are only more 
empathic than males in affective empathy indexes; for cognitive empathy index, e.g. 
role-taking, there is no gender difference (p. 58-59). Consistent with these two 
scholars’ findings and opinions, a popular explanation for higher empathy score in 
females is the self-presentational explanation; it is the expectation that females should 
be more sensitive and emotional responsive that made them respond in this pattern. 
Since in the current study females scored higher in all empathy-related constructs, 
Hoffman’s claim was not supported; further and deeper studies are needed for more 
specific reason for the equivocal gender difference in empathy. Third, several 
interesting patterns were found in protagonists group on dependent variables. It was 
found that the Chinese in the control group condition scored systematically higher in 
all empathy-related constructs; however, gender bias as an explanation can be 
excluded, since there was an approximately equal number of male and female 
participants in this condition. Thus, this could be just a coincidence. Another 




conditions, though the difference was not significant in Chinese sample; it could be 
because the reassuring effect of the in-group names. Fourth, the experimental 
manipulation did not influence the MIEG score, which supported Passini’s 
assumption that people’s moral inclusion/exclusion is a stable disposition. 
 
To sum up, as a replicated study, though the effect that participants with moral 
exclusion orientation would score lower in moral judgment in the out-group 
protagonists condition was not replicated here, the present study provided a good 
explanation for Passini’s original study—people turn off their empathy and 
perspective-taking automatically toward out-group, which then influences their moral 
judgment. Besides, the comparisons between Finnish and Chinese on moral judgment, 
moral inclusion/exclusion, and empathy factors also indicate problems in 
cross-cultural study on moral judgment, in that other moral domains, differentiated 
moral development stages, as well as social factors should also be taken into account. 
Last but not least, in both samples, almost all empathy-related scores (except EC in 
Finnish sample) and MIEG contributed independently to the P-score, which was 
unexpected but also very intriguing. Further studies are needed to explain it.  
 
Using online survey is the main limitation of this study and this could also be the 
reason that some results are not as expectated. First, the survey consisted of three 
measures covering about eighty questions, which is a heavy cognitive load for the 




attention. Second, self-reporting on emotional questions might fail to reflect the 
reality considering affective reactions are quick but reporting responses are slow with 
unobservable factors having an influence. Third, recruitment of participants was a 
long and difficult process and the small sample size might also affect the explanation 
power. Methodological improvements are needed for further studies. 
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Table: Nationality and Experiment Group on DIT scores and MIEG score (Mean rank) 














P-score 27.74 29.44 28.55 .952 19.59 18.38 19.12 .962 
PIS 30.52 23.03 30.87 .280 20.59 19.15 17.50 .781 
MNS 29.05 34.81 22.58 .084 16.77 21.27 18.62 .588 
MIEG 22.57 30.47 33.39 .094 18.05 17.88 20.92 .728 
Note. PIS = Personal Interest Schema score; MNS = Maintaining Norms Schema score; P-score (%) = 
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Ei pitäisi ilmiantaa häntä
Mielipiteitä sosiaalisista ongelmista
Hyvä opiskelijakollega! Liitteenä olevat kyselylomakkeet pyrkivät selvittämään, miten ihmiset ajattelevat sosiaalisia ongelmia. Eri ihmisillä on erilaisia mielipiteitä oikeasta ja väärästä.
Näihin kysymyksiin ei ole "oikeita" tai "vääriä" vastauksia samassa mielessä kuin matemaattisiin ongelmiin. Vastauksesi käsitellään tilastollisesti ja vain minä näen ne. Tämä tutkimus on
osa sosiaalipsykologian gradua Helsingin yliopistossa. Ohjaajani on prof. Klaus Helkama.
 
HEINZ JA LÄÄKE
Eräs nainen oli kuolemaisillaan erikoislaatuiseen syöpään Amerikassa. Oli olemassa lääke, jonka avulla lääkärit voisivat pelastaa hänet. Lääke oli erästä radiumin johdannaista, jonka
saman kaupungin apteekkari oli äskettäin keksinyt. Lääkkeen valmistaminen oli kallista, mutta apteekkari otti siitä kymmenkertaisen hinnan. Hän maksoi radiumista 1,000 dollaria ja
veloitti itse pienestä annoksesta lääkettä 10,000 dollaria. Sairaan naisen aviomies Heinz yritti lainata rahaa kaikilta tuttaviltaan. Hän sai kokoon vain 5,000 dollaria, puolet lääkkeen
hinnasta. Hän kertoi apteekkarille, että hänen vaimonsa oli kuolemaisillaan ja pyysi tätä myymään lääkkeen halvemmalla tai osamaksulla. Mutta apteekkari sanoi: "Ei, minä keksin
lääkkeen ja aion tehdä sen avulla rahaa". Heinz tuli epätoivoiseksi ja alkoi suunnitella murtoa miehen liikkeeseen varastaakseen vaimolleen lääkettä.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö Heinzin varastaa lääke?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Ei merkitystä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Ylläpidetäänkö yhteiskunnan lakeja?
* 2. Eikö ole luonnollista, että vaimoaan rakastava aviomies jopa varastaisi hänen vuokseen?
* 3. Onko Heinz valmis siihen, että hänet ammutaan murtovarkaana tai että hän joutuu
vankilaan siinä toivossa, ettälääkkeen varastaminen mahdollisesti auttaisi?
* 4. Onko Heinz ammattipainija tai onko hänellä huomattavaa vaikutusvaltaa
ammattipainijoiden keskuudessa?
* 5. Varastaako Heinz itsensä takia vai tekeekö hän sen ainoastaan auttaakseen toista?
* 6. Täytyykö apteekkarin oikeutta keksintöönsä kunnioittaa?
* 7. Onko elämän sisin olemus sosiaalisesti ja yksilöllisesti laajempi käsite kuin kuolemisen
lopettaminen?
* 8. Mihin arvoihin ihmisten keskinaäisen käyttäytymisen tulee pohjautua?
* 9. Annetaanko apteekkarin piiloutua arvottoman lain suojaan, joka suojelee joka
tapauksessa vain rikkaita?
* 10. Onko laki tässä tapauksessa jokaisen yhteiskunnan jäsenen perusoikeuden
toteuttamisen esteenä?
* 11. Ansaitseeko apteekkari joutua ryöstetyksi siitä hyvästä, että on niin ahne ja julma?
* 12. Aiheuttaisiko varastaminen tällaisessa tapauksessa kaiken kaikkiaan enemmän hyvää
kuin pahaa koko yhteiskunnalle?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:






Mies oli tuomittu vankeuteen kymmeneksi vuodeksi. Vuoden kuluttua hän kuitenkin pakeni vankilasta, muutti toiselle paikkakunnalle ja otti itselleen uuden nimen Thompson.
Kahdeksan vuotta hän teki ahkerasti työtä ja sai näin vähitellen säästetyksi tarpeeksi rahaa oman liikkeen ostamiseen. Hän oli reilu asiakkailleen ja antoi työntekijöilleen hyvää palkkaa.
Suurimman osan voitostaan hän antoi hyväntekeväisyyteen. Sitten eräänä päivänä hänen vanha naapurinsa rouva Jones huomasi, että hän olikin mies, joka oli karannut vankilasta
kahdeksan vuotta sitten ja jota poliisi oli etsinyt.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö rouva Jonesin ilmiantaa Thompson poliisille, jotta hänet toimitettaisiin takaisin vankilaan?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Tärkeä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Eikö Thompson ole hyvällä toiminnallaan jo osoittanut, ettei ole paha ihminen?
* 2. Eikö juuri rikoksen rankaisulta välttyminen rohkaise useampiin rikoksiin?
* 3. Emmekö tulisi paremmin toimeen ilman vankiloita ja laillisten järjestelmiemme sortoa?
* 4. Onko Thompson todella hyvittänyt tekonsa yhteiskunnalle?
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* 6. Mitä hyötyä olisi vankiloista yhteiskunnasta erillään, erityisesti ihmisystävälliselle miehelle?
* 7. Kuinka kukaan voisi olla niin julma ja sydämetön, että toimittaisi Thompsonin vankilaan?
* 8. Olisiko oikein muita vankeja kohtaan, jos Thompsonia ei vangittaisi?
* 9. Oliko rouva Jones Thompsonin hyvä ystävä?
* 10. Eikö kansalaisten velvollisuus ole ilmiantaa paennut rikollinen olosuhteista riippumatta?
* 11. Miten toimittaisiin parhaiten ihmisten tahdon sekä yleisen edun kannalta?
* 12. Olisiko Thompsonin vankilaan toimittaminen hänelle mitenkäaän kyväksi, tai suojelisiko tämä
toimenpide ketään?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:






Fred oli yhteiskoulun lukioluokkalainen. Hän halusi julkaista monistettua lehteä koululaisille, jotta he voisivat tuoda julki mielipiteitään. Hän halusi puhua rauhan puolesta sekä arvostella
joitakin koulun sääntöjä, kuten sääntöjä, joka kieltää poikia pitämästä pitkiä hiuksia. Ennen kuin Fred aloitti lehtensä tekemisen, pyysi hän luvan koulun rehtorilta. Rehtori sanoi
hyväksyvänsä asian sillä ehdolla, että Fred näyttäisi hänelle lehden jokaisen artikkelin ennen julkaisemista. Fred hyväksyi ehdon ja toi monia artikkeleita rehtorin hyväksyttäväksi.
Rehtori hyväksyi ne kaikki, ja Fred julkaisi kahden viikon kuluessa kaksi lehteä. Mutta rehtori ei ollut odottanut Fredin lehden herättävän näin paljon huomiota. Lehti innosti koululaisia
niin paljon, että he alkoivat järjestää mielenosoituksia "tukkasääntöä" ja muita koulun sääntöjä vastaan. Vihaiset vanhemmat paheksuivat Fredin mielipiteitä. He soittivat rehtorille ja
sanoivat, että lehti oli epäisänmaallinen eikä sitä saisi julkaista. Kiihtymyksen seurauksena rehtori käski Fredia lopettamaan julkaisemisen. Syyksi hän sanoi sen, että Fredin touhut
häiritsevät koulun toimintaa.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö rehtorin lakkauttaa lehti?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Tärkeä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Onko rehtori enemmän vastuussa koululaisille kuin vanhemmille?
* 2. Antoiko rehtori luvan lehden pitkäaikaiseen julkaisemiseen vai lupasiko hän hyväksyä
ainoastaan yhden lehden kerrallaan?
* 3. Alkaisivatko oppilaat esittää vielä enemmän vastalauseita, jos rehtori lakkauttaisi lehden?
* 4. Onko rehtorilla oikeus antaa käskyjä oppilaille silloin, kun koulun hyvinvointi on uhattuna?
* 5. Onko rehtorilla ilmaisuvapaus tässä tapauksessa-vapaus sanoa "ei"?
* 6. Jos rehtori lakkauttaisi lehden, estäisikö hän tällöin tarpeellisen keskustelun tärkeistä asioista?
* 7. Menettäisikö Fred uskonsa rehtoriin kiellon vuoksi?
* 8. Toimiko Fred todella reilusti kouluaan kohtaan ja isänmaallisesti?
* 9. Millainen vaikutus lehden lakkauttamisella olisi oppilaiden kriittisen ajattelun ja päättelyn
kehitykseen?
* 10. Loukkasiko Fred jollain tavoin toisten oikeuksia julkaisemalla omia mielipiteitään?
* 11. Pitäisikö rehtorin antaa muutamien vihaisten vanhempien vaikuttaa itseensä, sillä rhtorihan
parhaiten tietää mitä koulussa tapahtuu?
* 12. Käyttikö Fred lehteä herättääkseen vihaa ja tyytymättömyyttä?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:
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Vastaa seuraaviin kysymyksiin käyttämällä näitä vaihtoehtoja:
A (Ei kuvaa minua hyvin) B C D E (Kuvaa minua hyvin)
* 1. Tunnen usein lempeää huolta vähäosaisten puolesta.
* 2. Joskus minusta on vaikeaa nähdä asioita toisten näkökulmasta.
* 3. Kun toisilla ihmisillä on ongelmia, en toisinaan ole kovin pahoillani heidän puolestaan.
* 4. Tunnen tällä hetkellä hellyyttä muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 5. Hätätilanteissa tunnen oloni levottomaksi ja epämukavaksi.
* 6. Tunnen tällä hetkellä myötätuntoa muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 7. Erimielisyystilanteessa yritän katsoa tilannetta kaikkien kannalta ennen kuin teen päätöksen.
* 8. Kun näen, että joitakuita käytetään hyväksi, olen tavallaan suojeleva heitä kohtaan.
* 9. Joskus tunnen itseni avuttomaksi kun olen keskellä hyvin tunteellista tilannetta.
* 10. Joskus yritän ymmärtää ystäviäni paremmin kuvittelemalla, miltä asiat näyttävät heidän
näkökulmastaan.
* 11. Tunnen tällä hetkellä lämpimiä tunteita muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 12. Kun näen jonkun satuttavan itsensä, pysyn yleensä tyynenä.
* 13. Toisten epäonni ei yleensä vaivaa minua kovin paljon.
* 14. Jos olen varma, että olen oikeassa jonkin asian suhteen, en tuhlaa paljoakaan aikaa kuuntelemalla
muiden perusteluja.
* 15. Toiset liikuttavat mieltäni juuri nyt.
* 16. Jännittyneessä, tunteellisessa tilanteessa oleminen pelottaa minua.
* 17. En toisinaan sääli kovin paljon ihmisiä, joita näen kohdeltavan epäreilusti.
* 18. Toimin yleensä melko tehokkaasti hätätilanteissa.
* 19. Olen usein aika liikuttunut asioista, joita näen tapahtuvan.
* 20. Uskon, että jokaisessa kysymyksessä on kaksi puolta ja yritän ottaa ne molemmat huomioon.
* 21. Kuvailisin itseäni aika lämminsydämiseksi ihmiseksi.
* 22. Ajattelen toisia ihmisiä lämpimästi tällä hetkellä.
* 23. Usein hätätilanteissa menetän itsehillintäni.
* 24. Kun joku ihminen hermostuttaa minua, yritän yleensä hetkeksi “asettua hänen saappaisiinsa”.
* 25. Kun luen kiinnostavaa tarinaa tai romaania, kuvittelen mitä tuntisin, jos tarinan tapahtumat sattuisivat
minulle.
* 26. Kun näen jonkun, joka tarvitsee kipeästi apua hätätilanteessa, hajoan täysin.
* 27. Ennen kuin arvostelen jotakuta, yritän kuvitella, miltä minusta tuntuisi hänen asemassaan.
TAUSTATIEDOT
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Ei pitäisi ilmiantaa häntä
Mielipiteitä sosiaalisista ongelmista
Hyvä opiskelijakollega! Liitteenä olevat kyselylomakkeet pyrkivät selvittämään, miten ihmiset ajattelevat sosiaalisia ongelmia. Eri ihmisillä on erilaisia mielipiteitä oikeasta ja väärästä.
Näihin kysymyksiin ei ole "oikeita" tai "vääriä" vastauksia samassa mielessä kuin matemaattisiin ongelmiin. Vastauksesi käsitellään tilastollisesti ja vain minä näen ne. Tämä tutkimus on
osa sosiaalipsykologian gradua Helsingin yliopistossa. Ohjaajani on prof. Klaus Helkama.
 
MIKA JA LÄÄKE
Eräs nainen oli kuolemaisillaan erikoislaatuiseen syöpään Amerikassa. Oli olemassa lääke, jonka avulla lääkärit voisivat pelastaa hänet. Lääke oli erästä radiumin johdannaista, jonka
saman kaupungin apteekkari oli äskettäin keksinyt. Lääkkeen valmistaminen oli kallista, mutta apteekkari otti siitä kymmenkertaisen hinnan. Hän maksoi radiumista 1,000 dollaria ja
veloitti itse pienestä annoksesta lääkettä 10,000 dollaria. Sairaan naisen aviomies Mika yritti lainata rahaa kaikilta tuttaviltaan. Hän sai kokoon vain 5,000 dollaria, puolet lääkkeen
hinnasta. Hän kertoi apteekkarille, että hänen vaimonsa oli kuolemaisillaan ja pyysi tätä myymään lääkkeen halvemmalla tai osamaksulla. Mutta apteekkari sanoi: "Ei, minä keksin
lääkkeen ja aion tehdä sen avulla rahaa". Mika tuli epätoivoiseksi ja alkoi suunnitella murtoa miehen liikkeeseen varastaakseen vaimolleen lääkettä.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö Mikan varastaa lääke?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Ei merkitystä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Ylläpidetäänkö yhteiskunnan lakeja?
* 2. Eikö ole luonnollista, että vaimoaan rakastava aviomies jopa varastaisi hänen vuokseen?
* 3. Onko Mika valmis siihen, että hänet ammutaan murtovarkaana tai että hän joutuu
vankilaan siinä toivossa, ettälääkkeen varastaminen mahdollisesti auttaisi?
* 4. Onko Mika ammattipainija tai onko hänellä huomattavaa vaikutusvaltaa
ammattipainijoiden keskuudessa?
* 5. Varastaako Mika itsensä takia vai tekeekö hän sen ainoastaan auttaakseen toista?
* 6. Täytyykö apteekkarin oikeutta keksintöönsä kunnioittaa?
* 7. Onko elämän sisin olemus sosiaalisesti ja yksilöllisesti laajempi käsite kuin kuolemisen
lopettaminen?
* 8. Mihin arvoihin ihmisten keskinaäisen käyttäytymisen tulee pohjautua?
* 9. Annetaanko apteekkarin piiloutua arvottoman lain suojaan, joka suojelee joka
tapauksessa vain rikkaita?
* 10. Onko laki tässä tapauksessa jokaisen yhteiskunnan jäsenen perusoikeuden
toteuttamisen esteenä?
* 11. Ansaitseeko apteekkari joutua ryöstetyksi siitä hyvästä, että on niin ahne ja julma?
* 12. Aiheuttaisiko varastaminen tällaisessa tapauksessa kaiken kaikkiaan enemmän hyvää
kuin pahaa koko yhteiskunnalle?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:






Mies oli tuomittu vankeuteen kymmeneksi vuodeksi. Vuoden kuluttua hän kuitenkin pakeni vankilasta, muutti toiselle paikkakunnalle ja otti itselleen uuden nimen Tuomela. Kahdeksan
vuotta hän teki ahkerasti työtä ja sai näin vähitellen säästetyksi tarpeeksi rahaa oman liikkeen ostamiseen. Hän oli reilu asiakkailleen ja antoi työntekijöilleen hyvää palkkaa.
Suurimman osan voitostaan hän antoi hyväntekeväisyyteen. Sitten eräänä päivänä hänen vanha naapurinsa rouva Jokipii huomasi, että hän olikin mies, joka oli karannut vankilasta
kahdeksan vuotta sitten ja jota poliisi oli etsinyt.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö rouva Jokipiin ilmiantaa Tuomela poliisille, jotta hänet toimitettaisiin takaisin vankilaan?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Tärkeä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Eikö Tuomela ole hyvällä toiminnallaan jo osoittanut, ettei ole paha ihminen?
* 2. Eikö juuri rikoksen rankaisulta välttyminen rohkaise useampiin rikoksiin?
* 3. Emmekö tulisi paremmin toimeen ilman vankiloita ja laillisten järjestelmiemme sortoa?
* 4. Onko Tuomela todella hyvittänyt tekonsa yhteiskunnalle?
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* 6. Mitä hyötyä olisi vankiloista yhteiskunnasta erillään, erityisesti ihmisystävälliselle miehelle?
* 7. Kuinka kukaan voisi olla niin julma ja sydämetön, että toimittaisi Tuomelan vankilaan?
* 8. Olisiko oikein muita vankeja kohtaan, jos Tuomelaa ei vangittaisi?
* 9. Oliko rouva Jokipii Tuomelan hyvä ystävä?
* 10. Eikö kansalaisten vlvollisuus ole ilmiantaa paennut rikollinen olosuhteista riippumatta?
* 11. Miten toimittaisiin parhaiten ihmisten tahdon sekä yleisen edun kannalta?
* 12. Olisiko Tuomelan vankilaan toimittaminen hänelle mitenkäaän kyväksi, tai suojelisiko tämä
toimenpide ketään?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:






Pekka oli yhteiskoulun lukioluokkalainen. Hän halusi julkaista monistettua lehteä koululaisille, jotta he voisivat tuoda julki mielipiteitään. Hän halusi puhua rauhan puolesta sekä
arvostella joitakin koulun sääntöjä, kuten sääntöjä, joka kieltää poikia pitämästä pitkiä hiuksia. Ennen kuin Pekka aloitti lehtensä tekemisen, pyysi hän luvan koulun rehtorilta. Rehtori
sanoi hyväksyvänsä asian sillä ehdolla, että Pekka näyttäisi hänelle lehden jokaisen artikkelin ennen julkaisemista. Pekka hyväksyi ehdon ja toi monia artikkeleita rehtorin
hyväksyttäväksi. Rehtori hyväksyi ne kaikki, ja Pekka julkaisi kahden viikon kuluessa kaksi lehteä. Mutta rehtori ei ollut odottanut Pekan lehden herättävän näin paljon huomiota. Lehti
innosti koululaisia niin paljon, että he alkoivat järjestää mielenosoituksia "tukkasääntöä" ja muita koulun sääntöjä vastaan. Vihaiset vanhemmat paheksuivat Pekan mielipiteitä. He
soittivat rehtorille ja sanoivat, että lehti oli epäisänmaallinen eikä sitä saisi julkaista. Kiihtymyksen seurauksena rehtori käski Pekkaa lopettamaan julkaisemisen. Syyksi hän sanoi sen,
että Pekan touhut häiritsevät koulun toimintaa.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö rehtorin lakkauttaa lehti?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Tärkeä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Onko rehtori enemmän vastuussa koululaisille kuin vanhemmille?
* 2. Antoiko rehtori luvan lehden pitkäaikaiseen julkaisemiseen vai lupasiko hän hyväksyä
ainoastaan yhden lehden kerrallaan?
* 3. Alkaisivatko oppilaat esittää vielä enemmän vastalauseita, jos rehtori lakkauttaisi lehden?
* 4. Onko rehtorilla oikeus antaa käskyjä oppilaille silloin, kun koulun hyvinvointi on uhattuna?
* 5. Onko rehtorilla ilmaisuvapaus tässä tapauksessa-vapaus sanoa "ei"?
* 6. Jos rehtori lakkauttaisi lehden, estäisikö hän tällöin tarpeellisen keskustelun tärkeistä asioista?
* 7. Menettäisikö Pekka uskonsa rehtoriin kiellon vuoksi?
* 8. Toimiko Pekka todella reilusti kouluaan kohtaan ja isänmaallisesti?
* 9. Millainen vaikutus lehden lakkauttamisella olisi oppilaiden kriittisen ajattelun ja päättelyn
kehitykseen?
* 10. Loukkasiko Pekka jollain tavoin toisten oikeuksia julkaisemalla omia mielipiteitään?
* 11. Pitäisikö rehtorin antaa muutamien vihaisten vanhempien vaikuttaa itseensä, sillä rhtorihan
parhaiten tietää mitä koulussa tapahtuu?
* 12. Käyttikö Pekka lehteä herättääkseen vihaa ja tyytymättömyyttä?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:
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Vastaa seuraaviin kysymyksiin käyttämällä näitä vaihtoehtoja:
A (Ei kuvaa minua hyvin) B C D E (Kuvaa minua hyvin)
* 1. Tunnen usein lempeää huolta vähäosaisten puolesta.
* 2. Joskus minusta on vaikeaa nähdä asioita toisten näkökulmasta.
* 3. Kun toisilla ihmisillä on ongelmia, en toisinaan ole kovin pahoillani heidän puolestaan.
* 4. Tunnen tällä hetkellä hellyyttä muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 5. Hätätilanteissa tunnen oloni levottomaksi ja epämukavaksi.
* 6. Tunnen tällä hetkellä myötätuntoa muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 7. Erimielisyystilanteessa yritän katsoa tilannetta kaikkien kannalta ennen kuin teen päätöksen.
* 8. Kun näen, että joitakuita käytetään hyväksi, olen tavallaan suojeleva heitä kohtaan.
* 9. Joskus tunnen itseni avuttomaksi kun olen keskellä hyvin tunteellista tilannetta.
* 10. Joskus yritän ymmärtää ystäviäni paremmin kuvittelemalla, miltä asiat näyttävät heidän
näkökulmastaan.
* 11. Tunnen tällä hetkellä lämpimiä tunteita muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 12. Kun näen jonkun satuttavan itsensä, pysyn yleensä tyynenä.
* 13. Toisten epäonni ei yleensä vaivaa minua kovin paljon.
* 14. Jos olen varma, että olen oikeassa jonkin asian suhteen, en tuhlaa paljoakaan aikaa kuuntelemalla
muiden perusteluja.
* 15. Toiset liikuttavat mieltäni juuri nyt.
* 16. Jännittyneessä, tunteellisessa tilanteessa oleminen pelottaa minua.
* 17. En toisinaan sääli kovin paljon ihmisiä, joita näen kohdeltavan epäreilusti.
* 18. Toimin yleensä melko tehokkaasti hätätilanteissa.
* 19. Olen usein aika liikuttunut asioista, joita näen tapahtuvan.
* 20. Uskon, että jokaisessa kysymyksessä on kaksi puolta ja yritän ottaa ne molemmat huomioon.
* 21. Kuvailisin itseäni aika lämminsydämiseksi ihmiseksi.
* 22. Ajattelen toisia ihmisiä lämpimästi tällä hetkellä.
* 23. Usein hätätilanteissa menetän itsehillintäni.
* 24. Kun joku ihminen hermostuttaa minua, yritän yleensä hetkeksi “asettua hänen saappaisiinsa”.
* 25. Kun luen kiinnostavaa tarinaa tai romaania, kuvittelen mitä tuntisin, jos tarinan tapahtumat sattuisivat
minulle.
* 26. Kun näen jonkun, joka tarvitsee kipeästi apua hätätilanteessa, hajoan täysin.
* 27. Ennen kuin arvostelen jotakuta, yritän kuvitella, miltä minusta tuntuisi hänen asemassaan.
TAUSTATIEDOT
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Ei pitäisi ilmiantaa häntä
Mielipiteitä sosiaalisista ongelmista
Hyvä opiskelijakollega! Liitteenä olevat kyselylomakkeet pyrkivät selvittämään, miten ihmiset ajattelevat sosiaalisia ongelmia. Eri ihmisillä on erilaisia mielipiteitä oikeasta ja väärästä.
Näihin kysymyksiin ei ole "oikeita" tai "vääriä" vastauksia samassa mielessä kuin matemaattisiin ongelmiin. Vastauksesi käsitellään tilastollisesti ja vain minä näen ne. Tämä tutkimus on
osa sosiaalipsykologian gradua Helsingin yliopistossa. Ohjaajani on prof. Klaus Helkama.
 
ANDREI JA LÄÄKE
Eräs nainen oli kuolemaisillaan erikoislaatuiseen syöpään Amerikassa. Oli olemassa lääke, jonka avulla lääkärit voisivat pelastaa hänet. Lääke oli erästä radiumin johdannaista, jonka
saman kaupungin apteekkari oli äskettäin keksinyt. Lääkkeen valmistaminen oli kallista, mutta apteekkari otti siitä kymmenkertaisen hinnan. Hän maksoi radiumista 1,000 dollaria ja
veloitti itse pienestä annoksesta lääkettä 10,000 dollaria. Sairaan naisen aviomies Andrei yritti lainata rahaa kaikilta tuttaviltaan. Hän sai kokoon vain 5,000 dollaria, puolet lääkkeen
hinnasta. Hän kertoi apteekkarille, että hänen vaimonsa oli kuolemaisillaan ja pyysi tätä myymään lääkkeen halvemmalla tai osamaksulla. Mutta apteekkari sanoi: "Ei, minä keksin
lääkkeen ja aion tehdä sen avulla rahaa". Andrei tuli epätoivoiseksi ja alkoi suunnitella murtoa miehen liikkeeseen varastaakseen vaimolleen lääkettä.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö Andrein varastaa lääke?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Ei merkitystä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Ylläpidetäänkö yhteiskunnan lakeja?
* 2. Eikö ole luonnollista, että vaimoaan rakastava aviomies jopa varastaisi hänen vuokseen?
* 3. Onko Andrei valmis siihen, että hänet ammutaan murtovarkaana tai että hän joutuu
vankilaan siinä toivossa, ettälääkkeen varastaminen mahdollisesti auttaisi?
* 4. Onko Andrei ammattipainija tai onko hänellä huomattavaa vaikutusvaltaa
ammattipainijoiden keskuudessa?
* 5. Varastaako Andrei itsensä takia vai tekeekö hän sen ainoastaan auttaakseen toista?
* 6. Täytyykö apteekkarin oikeutta keksintöönsä kunnioittaa?
* 7. Onko elämän sisin olemus sosiaalisesti ja yksilöllisesti laajempi käsite kuin kuolemisen
lopettaminen?
* 8. Mihin arvoihin ihmisten keskinaäisen käyttäytymisen tulee pohjautua?
* 9. Annetaanko apteekkarin piiloutua arvottoman lain suojaan, joka suojelee joka
tapauksessa vain rikkaita?
* 10. Onko laki tässä tapauksessa jokaisen yhteiskunnan jäsenen perusoikeuden
toteuttamisen esteenä?
* 11. Ansaitseeko apteekkari joutua ryöstetyksi siitä hyvästä, että on niin ahne ja julma?
* 12. Aiheuttaisiko varastaminen tällaisessa tapauksessa kaiken kaikkiaan enemmän hyvää
kuin pahaa koko yhteiskunnalle?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:






Mies oli tuomittu vankeuteen kymmeneksi vuodeksi. Vuoden kuluttua hän kuitenkin pakeni vankilasta, muutti toiselle paikkakunnalle ja otti itselleen uuden nimen Ivanov. Kahdeksan
vuotta hän teki ahkerasti työtä ja sai näin vähitellen säästetyksi tarpeeksi rahaa oman liikkeen ostamiseen. Hän oli reilu asiakkailleen ja antoi työntekijöilleen hyvää palkkaa.
Suurimman osan voitostaan hän antoi hyväntekeväisyyteen. Sitten eräänä päivänä hänen vanha naapurinsa rouva Jones huomasi, että hän olikin mies, joka oli karannut vankilasta
kahdeksan vuotta sitten ja jota poliisi oli etsinyt.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö rouva Jonesin ilmiantaa Ivanov poliisille, jotta hänet toimitettaisiin takaisin vankilaan?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Tärkeä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Eikö Ivanov ole hyvällä toiminnallaan jo osoittanut, ettei ole paha ihminen?
* 2. Eikö juuri rikoksen rankaisulta välttyminen rohkaise useampiin rikoksiin?
* 3. Emmekö tulisi paremmin toimeen ilman vankiloita ja laillisten järjestelmiemme sortoa?
* 4. Onko Ivanov todella hyvittänyt tekonsa yhteiskunnalle?
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* 6. Mitä hyötyä olisi vankiloista yhteiskunnasta erillään, erityisesti ihmisystävälliselle miehelle?
* 7. Kuinka kukaan voisi olla niin julma ja sydämetön, että toimittaisi Ivanovin vankilaan?
* 8. Olisiko oikein muita vankeja kohtaan, jos Ivanovia ei vangittaisi?
* 9. Oliko rouva Jones Ivanovin hyvä ystävä?
* 10. Eikö kansalaisten vlvollisuus ole ilmiantaa paennut rikollinen olosuhteista riippumatta?
* 11. Miten toimittaisiin parhaiten ihmisten tahdon sekä yleisen edun kannalta?
* 12. Olisiko Ivanovin vankilaan toimittaminen hänelle mitenkäaän kyväksi, tai suojelisiko tämä
toimenpide ketään?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:






Pavel oli yhteiskoulun lukioluokkalainen. Hän halusi julkaista monistettua lehteä koululaisille, jotta he voisivat tuoda julki mielipiteitään. Hän halusi puhua rauhan puolesta sekä
arvostella joitakin koulun sääntöjä, kuten sääntöjä, joka kieltää poikia pitämästä pitkiä hiuksia. Ennen kuin Pavel aloitti lehtensä tekemisen, pyysi hän luvan koulun rehtorilta. Rehtori
sanoi hyväksyvänsä asian sillä ehdolla, että Pavel näyttäisi hänelle lehden jokaisen artikkelin ennen julkaisemista. Pavel hyväksyi ehdon ja toi monia artikkeleita rehtorin
hyväksyttäväksi. Rehtori hyväksyi ne kaikki, ja Pavel julkaisi kahden viikon kuluessa kaksi lehteä. Mutta rehtori ei ollut odottanut Pavelin lehden herättävän näin paljon huomiota. Lehti
innosti koululaisia niin paljon, että he alkoivat järjestää mielenosoituksia "tukkasääntöä" ja muita koulun sääntöjä vastaan. Vihaiset vanhemmat paheksuivat Pavelin mielipiteitä. He
soittivat rehtorille ja sanoivat, että lehti oli epäisänmaallinen eikä sitä saisi julkaista. Kiihtymyksen seurauksena rehtori käski Pavelia lopettamaan julkaisemisen. Syyksi hän sanoi sen,
että Pavelin touhut häiritsevät koulun toimintaa.
Ole hyvä ja vastaa seuraavaan kysymykseen.
* Pitäisikö rehtorin lakkauttaa lehti?
Lue kaikki väittämät 1 -12. Merkitse kunkin väittämän kohdalla, kuinka tärkeänä pidät sitä ratkaistaessa ongelmaa.
Erittäin tärkeä Tärkeä Melko tärkeä Vähän tärkeä Ei merkitystä
* 1. Onko rehtori enemmän vastuussa koululaisille kuin vanhemmille?
* 2. Antoiko rehtori luvan lehden pitkäaikaiseen julkaisemiseen vai lupasiko hän hyväksyä
ainoastaan yhden lehden kerrallaan?
* 3. Alkaisivatko oppilaat esittää vielä enemmän vastalauseita, jos rehtori lakkauttaisi lehden?
* 4. Onko rehtorilla oikeus antaa käskyjä oppilaille silloin, kun koulun hyvinvointi on uhattuna?
* 5. Onko rehtorilla ilmaisuvapaus tässä tapauksessa-vapaus sanoa "ei"?
* 6. Jos rehtori lakkauttaisi lehden, estäisikö hän tällöin tarpeellisen keskustelun tärkeistä asioista?
* 7. Menettäisikö Pavel uskonsa rehtoriin kiellon vuoksi?
* 8. Toimiko Pavel todella reilusti kouluaan kohtaan ja isänmaallisesti?
* 9. Millainen vaikutus lehden lakkauttamisella olisi oppilaiden kriittisen ajattelun ja päättelyn
kehitykseen?
* 10. Loukkasiko Pavel jollain tavoin toisten oikeuksia julkaisemalla omia mielipiteitään?
* 11. Pitäisikö rehtorin antaa muutamien vihaisten vanhempien vaikuttaa itseensä, sillä rhtorihan
parhaiten tietää mitä koulussa tapahtuu?
* 12. Käyttikö Pavel lehteä herättääkseen vihaa ja tyytymättömyyttä?
Valitse näkökohta, joka on mielestäsi:
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Vastaa seuraaviin kysymyksiin käyttämällä näitä vaihtoehtoja:
A (Ei kuvaa minua hyvin) B C D E (Kuvaa minua hyvin)
* 1. Tunnen usein lempeää huolta vähäosaisten puolesta.
* 2. Joskus minusta on vaikeaa nähdä asioita toisten näkökulmasta.
* 3. Kun toisilla ihmisillä on ongelmia, en toisinaan ole kovin pahoillani heidän puolestaan.
* 4. Tunnen tällä hetkellä hellyyttä muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 5. Hätätilanteissa tunnen oloni levottomaksi ja epämukavaksi.
* 6. Tunnen tällä hetkellä myötätuntoa muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 7. Erimielisyystilanteessa yritän katsoa tilannetta kaikkien kannalta ennen kuin teen päätöksen.
* 8. Kun näen, että joitakuita käytetään hyväksi, olen tavallaan suojeleva heitä kohtaan.
* 9. Joskus tunnen itseni avuttomaksi kun olen keskellä hyvin tunteellista tilannetta.
* 10. Joskus yritän ymmärtää ystäviäni paremmin kuvittelemalla, miltä asiat näyttävät heidän
näkökulmastaan.
* 11. Tunnen tällä hetkellä lämpimiä tunteita muita ihmisiä kohtaan.
* 12. Kun näen jonkun satuttavan itsensä, pysyn yleensä tyynenä.
* 13. Toisten epäonni ei yleensä vaivaa minua kovin paljon.
* 14. Jos olen varma, että olen oikeassa jonkin asian suhteen, en tuhlaa paljoakaan aikaa kuuntelemalla
muiden perusteluja.
* 15. Toiset liikuttavat mieltäni juuri nyt.
* 16. Jännittyneessä, tunteellisessa tilanteessa oleminen pelottaa minua.
* 17. En toisinaan sääli kovin paljon ihmisiä, joita näen kohdeltavan epäreilusti.
* 18. Toimin yleensä melko tehokkaasti hätätilanteissa.
* 19. Olen usein aika liikuttunut asioista, joita näen tapahtuvan.
* 20. Uskon, että jokaisessa kysymyksessä on kaksi puolta ja yritän ottaa ne molemmat huomioon.
* 21. Kuvailisin itseäni aika lämminsydämiseksi ihmiseksi.
* 22. Ajattelen toisia ihmisiä lämpimästi tällä hetkellä.
* 23. Usein hätätilanteissa menetän itsehillintäni.
* 24. Kun joku ihminen hermostuttaa minua, yritän yleensä hetkeksi “asettua hänen saappaisiinsa”.
* 25. Kun luen kiinnostavaa tarinaa tai romaania, kuvittelen mitä tuntisin, jos tarinan tapahtumat sattuisivat
minulle.
* 26. Kun näen jonkun, joka tarvitsee kipeästi apua hätätilanteessa, hajoan täysin.
* 27. Ennen kuin arvostelen jotakuta, yritän kuvitella, miltä minusta tuntuisi hänen asemassaan.
TAUSTATIEDOT
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